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Pensions and age specific death rates are intertwined in several
ways. Pensions provide a mechanism to remove the uncertainty about date
of death from consumption planning. Age specific death rates determine
the cost and value of pensions.
In this paper, we use the Retirement History Survey to estimate reduced
form functions for the probability of having a pension when the person
reaches 65 and on the dollar amount of the pension. We also evaluate
the effect of 15% drop in age specific death rates from 1973 to 1979 on
the costs of a pension.
We find that the probability of having a pension is related to edu-
cation, marital status, occupation, industry and assets. The probability
equation is very similar for males and females.
We find that the sharp drop in death rates has only a marginal impact
on the cost of providing a pension.
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Pension and age specific death rates are intertwined in several ways. A
pension involves a trade of present for future consumption. The expected
value of the trade depends on age specific death rates since the individual
and perhaps spouse will continue to collect the pension while alive.
Decreases in death rates will increase the value of the pension to the worker
and the cost to the company. Individual differences In expected death rates
will also alter the expected value of a pension and may well affect the choice
of occupation and the distribution of current and future consumption.
People do not know with certainty when they wIll die. Most people plan
to spend part of their life cycle retired during which their consumption will
be based. on past public and private savings. A pension is an asset that can
remove the uncertainty about date of death from consumption planning.
The mortality and pension linakges are important currently for tw diffe—
rent reasons. First there has been a sharp and probably unexpected drop in
age specific death iates in the 1970's. Thus the cost and value of pensions
have changed. In this paper we will examine the implication of this mortality
decline on the present discounted value of pension benefits and the distri-
bution across certain groups. Second there are proposals for mandatory pen-
sion coverage. If the population currently drawing pensions is a selected
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1one, a mandatory pension plan could expect a different experience than history
provides. Thus in this paper, we will also examine the extent to which the
pension population differs from the total population in a given age cohort.
We will begin by deriving and estimating pension reduced form equa-
tions. We will then estimate mortality equations. We will also see how
morbidity and mortality are related to pension coverage. Finally we will
examine the implications of recent and prospective mortality changes on. the
present discounted value of the pension benefits.
The Demand for Pensions
In this section we will consider briefly the demand for pensions by
consumers. Pensions are a form of wealth with some important risk and safety
features. A pension is an asset which pays a stream of benefits beginning at.
some future date and terminating at the death of either the holder or the
holder and spouse. The expected stream of benefits need not be fixed but may
be indexed to the price level or depend on current earnings though most pen-
sions pay a fixed nominal or real benefit level (when both holder and spouse
are alive). A pension differs from an annuity in that the individual
purchases the annuity but receives the pension as part of his compensation for
working. Also a pension can be riskier than an annuity in that many pensions
require a minimum number of years of work before the individual is entitled to
any benefits. Moreover some pensions are not fully funded and will not pay
full benefits If the company goes bankrupt (unless the pension Is insured).
A pension differs from a savings account or other assets in that a pen-
sion (in a non—bankrupt firm) guarantees a fixed budget level till timeof
death but does not provide a bequest. Other assets such as a savings account,
2can be used to finance consumption while retired and to provide a bequest upon
death, but with these assets the annual consumption stream will be reduced if
a person lives longer than he expects.
A useful way to derive a demand for pensions is via the life cycle con-
sumption savings model of Modigliani, Brumberg, and Ando (MBA). Wewill
initially construct this model in a world with no taxes, a fixed life span and
retirement date, and a single asset. We will then introduce uncertainty as to
the two dates and consider the impacts on the level and composition of assets.
Assume that the consumer has an initial wealth endowment of A0, and will
receive labor earnings of Y In each year before retirement at T and zero
earnings thereafter.
Then the Individual wishes to maximize his utility function subject to a
multiperiod wealth constraint.
1)Max U(C0,...,C,B÷i)
2) Subject to At =A_i(1+r)+ (Y —PCt)t=l,...,T< N and
B+i
=A
A is wealth at the end of the year,
B is bequests,
Cis consumption,
P is the price of consumer goods,
r isthe interest rate,
Tis retirement date,
N is date of death.
3Maximization of (1) subject to (2) will yield first order conditions
which can be manipulated to obtain demand functions for C in each time
period. These are of the form:
3) Ct = r, A0, Y, T, N)
En the original model, MBA assumed B =rA0 =0.They showed that with.an
homogenous utility function, a person would consume an equal amount in each





A person would save Y—C =(1=— ) Yin all years. before retiring and dissave
N
(T/N)Y each year during his retirement.
Once the dates of retirement and death are uncertain, an individual can
not be guaranteed of having enough resources to consume the amount given in 4)
in each year. The individual, however, can convert the uncertain streaa into
a certain stream by buying an annuity and life insurance to provide B. In. a
classic paper, Yaari shows that if an annuity pays an actuarially fair
interest rate and if the consumer's rate of time preference equals the
interest rate, then the consumer who purchases an annuity will have the same
constant consumption stream with mortality uncertainty as with no uncertainty.
In an elegant examination of a problem equivalent to ours, Rosen and
Thaler demonstrate that the demand for the annuity (insurance) will depend on
the load factor which reduces the return below the actuarially fair return.
4In general risk adverse individuals will be willing to pay apremium to have
an annuity and reduce some of theirrisks. The demand will also depend on the
after tax rate of return.
Annuities are not a commonly held asset in the U.S. while pensions are
widely held.2 Thus it may appear that the abovefocus is misspent. There are
however, two considerations which also bear on our specificationof the demand
function. First most workers in the U.S. are eligible forSocial Security
benefits, which is a public annuity/pension that nearlyall workers are forced
to buy and which pays a high after tax rate ofreturn.3 The low use of
private annunities may reflect the substitutionof public for private
annuities. Second pensions are treated more favorably thanannuities in. the
U.S. income tax laws since taxes on eligible pension contributions are
deferred until paid out as benefits when a person is usuallyin a lower tax
bracket.
The above considerations suggest that expected social securitybenefits
should be included in the demand for annuities and thedemand for pensions.
The second point is that a person's tax bracket shouldaffect his demand for
pension.
If pensions were vested instantaneously, then the demandfor pensions
would depend on the same variables as in the annuityfunction. Most pensions
require a minimum service and age before thebenefits are vested. While this
suggests the inclusion of a probabilityof being vested variable, this will
2 See forexample, Projector and Weiss.
The return is high because the employer's contribution is not subject to tax
and because contributions of current workers are used to subsidize current
retirees.
5not be done because we do not have the necessary data.
The demand for pensions, thus, can be written as
5) PEN =F(PPEN,Y, T, N, s, s, SS, A, tax, r)
where the new variables are
pEN is the price of pensions,
QPEN is the quantity of pensions,
is the variance or other risk measure for T,
is the variance or other risk measure for N,
tax is the person's tax bracket,
SS is the expected Social Security benefits.
The Supply of Pensions
Employers currently are not required to provide pensions. Employers may
choose to do so for two distinct reasons: to maximize their own welfare and
to maximize theexpected worth of the firm.Even for a marriedperson the
marginaltax rate in the federal Income tax exceeds 50Z when taxable Income is
$60,000.Whenthemanageris the owner, he has strong Incentives to take much
of his pay In tax favored forms.4 Even In corporations In which ownership and
management are separated, the principal and the agent have incentives to use
pensions. In a competitive system, a worker may receive a conipensation rate
suchthat




is the marginal utility of leisure,
is the marginal utility of goods,
COM is the hourly compensation rate
Pis the price of goods or market product consumption.
Since COM equals the after tax wage rate plus the after tax pension.
contribution and the tax on the contribution is deferred to retirement, the
firm can pay a smaller amount by using pensions.
There is an important additional reason for firms using pensions. Firms
often make substantial investments in workers while training the worker and
obtaining information as to the abilities of each worker. Following Becker,
firm specific on the job training costs are borneby the employer who can have
his Investment wiped out by the employee leaving. Pensions based on length of
service encourage employees to remain with the firm.
The above considerations will vary by position in the firm which we will
proxy by education, by occupation, and by industry. Thus the supply of pen—
sions can be written as
7)PEN =G(PPEI,ED, OC,IND,tax, taxH)
where
tax is the average tax rate of employees,
tax is the tax bracket of top employees.
7Equating supply and demand, we obtain a reduced form equation for the
quantity of pensions which does not include the price of pensionsbut does
include all the other variables which are exogenous.
If data on the price of pensions or the load factor were available,, it
would be possible to estimate 5) and 7) since there are exogenous variables
that appear in one and not the other. Our sample does not have such data. It
does have information which will permit us to estimate the person's ta brac—
ket late in life but not information during most of the period in which pen-
sions are accumualted. Thus tax and tax11 will be omitted.
Econometric Specification
The model presented above obtains a reduced form equation for pensions.
We will estimate the model in two steps. First we will estimate a probit
equation for the probability of having or expecting to have a pension. Second
for those with nonzero pensions, we will estimate an OLS equation for the
dollar amount of the pension. Work of Heckman and others suggests that this
two stage procedure will yield baised coefficients for the demand for dollar
amount of pensions. We could use the inverse of the Mills ratio approach to
eliminate the bias, but since we use he same exogenous variables in both
equations and since we have no strong priors on the functional forms,identi-
fication is suspect.
While these techniques used are straightforward, there are several, diffi-
culties to be faced. Persons choosing jobs generally have available to them
different mixes of wages and pensions for a given compensation rate. Some
people may have different risk preferences. Often such tastedifferences are
assumed to vary by education level which is aireadly included in our system
8and whose coefficients will be difficult to interpret uniquely. However if
tastes differ within education groups, the Thaler—Rosen analysis suggests that
people with different risk preferences will sort themselves by occupation and
that observed wage and pension packages partly reflect differences in prefer—
ences for risk. This also suggests that we should not include wage rates or
earnings as exogenous variables in our equations.
The Data
The primary data to be used come from the Retirement History Survey
(RHS).5 The Retirement History Survey commenced in 1969. In that year a
random sample of some 11,000 men and women who were heads of hOusehold and
between the ages of 58 and 63 inclusive participated in a lengthy survey. The
major areas in which data were collected include current and past labor force
activity, current earnings and income, family structure, education, expendi-
tures of various sorts, and health and the availability of public and private
pensions. The same people or their widows were reinterviewed every second
year until 1979. We currently have the 1969, 1971 and 1973 waves.
Results
We have estimated probit equations for the probability of (expecting to)
receive a pension and OLS regressions for the dollar amount of nonzero pen-
sions. The probability of receiving a pension is measured by- the answer to
the 1971 question "Which of the following sources of income do you expect to
receive money from (when you have stopped working or five years from now)?
This sample is being used extensively in economics. For a full description
see Ireland. For some uses, see Boskin, Burkhauser, or Quinn.
9There are at least three difficulties with this question. First some people
in the sample do not expect to ever stop working and the above wording could
elicit a "no" answer to the expected pension question if the pension will
start later than 1976. To control for this problem, we have included a dummy
variable which has a value of 1 if people expect to stop working in the 5
years after 1971 when all the men will be at least 65 years old. However, one
of the reasons that people may expect to stop working is that they are in poor
health and have a shorter life expectancy.
Second the pension question was asked first in 1971. Those who died in
1969 or 1970 could not answer the pension question and were excluded from the
analysis. Third in 1971 when they are at least 60 years old, some people may
not expect to receive a pension but qualify subsequently. We believe this to
be a minor problem.
Results for men are given in Table 1. We find nearly every variable used
is statistically significant and only two have "t" statistics less thart 1.
Most of the coefficients seem quite reasonable. Based on the derivative of
the probability function evaluated at the means, married and single mert are
about 1OZ more likely to expect to have a pension than divorced men. Divorced
men in this age group have much worse, life expectancy prospects. Moreover
ongoing research by Bartel and Taubman suggests that those that many of the
divorced contract severe mental problems that affect earnings and quite
possibly job stability and thus risk loss of nonvested pensions.
The more educated are more likely to have pensions. As noted earlier,
there are a number of possible reasons for this finding. It is of some
interest that this derivative is about 50% greater when industry is not
controlled for. Black men are about 14% less likely to expect a pensiom even
10when we control for industry and occupation and total wealth.
To help capture the business supply of pensions we have included occu-
pation and industry dummies. The RHS obtains information on current and
longest occupation. We have used the longest occupation. The omitted occu-
pations are clerical and kindred, and sales and the few cases of no answer.
Once we control for industry, professionals (and technical) and blue collar
(and operators and farm laborers) workers have higher probabilities of recei-
ving pensions while nonfarm managers and technicians have a lower though
statistically insignificant probability. However when the industry variables
are omitted, the professional dummy is insignificant and the manager dummy is
significantly negative.6
Self employed people are much less likely to have a pension in this time
period.7 Compared to those in mining, construction, wholesale and retail
trade, finance, insurance and real estate, the probability of receiving, a
pension is significantly higher for those in government, manufacturing,, and
utilities, and significantly lower for those in farming.
Those who expect to stop working are 10% more likely to receive a pension
than those who don't. While this may simply mean that those who expect not to
retire don't have to have much private saving to finance old age consumption,
we believe that this variable either corrects for a deficiency in the pension
6
Several people have suggested that there are many small stores with a few
employees and a manager. These managers may not receive pensions. We do not
have information on size of firms to test this proposition. We have data on
Social Security covered earnings in previous years. We ran some equations in
which we include the monthly benefits a pension s entitled to from Social
Security. The benefit variable is significant but its inclusion has little
impact on the coefficient on manager.
This is before Keogh's were available, but such plans might logically- be
included in annuities rather than pensions.
11question asked or is a proxy for health. Omission of this variable has little
impact on the other variables except being single which becomes insignificant
and being a manager which becomes significant.8
We have added together the midpoint of the holdings in the various cate-
gories for each asset and liability except pensions to obtain net assets. We
expect this variable to be quite noisy. It has, however, a highly significant
positive coefficient.
We have estimated another equation in which we add the square of the
assets and the interaction of eduation with assets and its square. The
results are presented in Table 2. The three new variables are highly
significant with diminishing returns to assets and with education effects
growing for assets less than 1/3 of $1 million.
The impact of longer life expectancy of pension companies depend on the
size of the pension holding of various groups. In Table 3 we present some OLS
regressionsfor expected nonzero pension payments for five years hence for
those alive in 1971. We find far fewer variables are significant thart in the
probit equations.
None of the marital status variables are significant. Professionals and
managers have significantly larger pensions than clerical, sales and blue
collarworkers. Government workers have much larger and the self—employed
8 Forsome purpose vested pensions and annuities might be considered near
perfect substitutes. We havereestimated the probit equation where the
dependent variable is 1 ifyou expect a pension of an annuity or both..
Thereare no changes in sign of the coefficient. The extra
probabilities, calculated at the mean, are little changed except that the
coefficient on self—e&aployed is somewhat closer to zero and the coefficient on
assets is larger. Both changes are sensible since the self—employed could
treat annuities and pensions as near perfect substitutes and since the wealthy
may wish to convert non job related wealth into a safe asset for the
retirement period.
12much smaller pensions. The more educated and the wealthier also have larger
pensions.
The RHS sample also contains Information on women who are heads of
household. About 22% of the women compared to 35% of the men expect to
receive a pension. While far fewer women than men expect to receive a
pension, the pattern of coefficients and derivatives at the mean are very
similar except that single and widowed women are more likely to have pensions
thna divorced women. See Table 4.
The regressions for women with positive pensions are given in Table 5.
There are only 565 observations which may explain why the results differ so
from men and why so few variables are significant.
Self Selection Into Pension Plans
In 1971 about 1/3 of the men and 1/4 of the women heads of household
expected to receive a pension. There can be a variety of reasons why most
were not vested. One possible reason is that people with shorter expected
lives would prefer, ceteris paribus to take jobs with higher current
earnings. In this section, we will explore some suggestive but Inconci*isive
evidence; however, we acknowledge at this point that even for the results
there Is an alternative explanation which is that severe health problems may
cause an individual to be ineligible for certain jobs or to remain at a firm
long enough to become vested.
The RUS survey asks people how their health compares to others of the
same age. The possible answers are better, same, or worse. While subjective,
Taubman and Rosen argue that this variable behaves like one would expect an
objective measure to behave. For example, those in worse health in 1969 are
13several times more likely to die over the next 4 years than those in better
health.
Of course the variable measures health in 1969 when the men were at least
58 years old. This variable need not be strongly correlated with health when
pension acquisition and occupation and industry decisions were made. However
the R2 between 1971 and 1973 health is about .6.
We have included 1969 and 1971 health in some pension probit equations.
The two sets of health variables are intercorrelated and it Is difficult to
obtain sensible results when both sets are included. Our best results are
obtained using 1969 health. Those in worse health are significantly less
likely to expect to receive a pension 5 years after 1971. The derivative at
the mean of the variables is —.03. The coefficients on the other variables
are not greatly affected when health is added except that of widower which is
reduced in size but increased in significance.
The social security benefits one is entitled to depend partly on past
earnings and thus health.9 When a retirement benefit variable Is calculated
on the basis of past earnings reported to Social Security Is included ia the
probit equations, the benefit variable becomes insignificant)0
An alternative way to examine the self selectionissue is to compare the
pattern of results of age specific mortality rats and the probability of
having a pension. Table 6 contains the probit for 1969—1973 mortality for
men.
There are several variables in Table 6 that are statistically
Tharte1 and Taubmanshowthat certain diseases have very long run and: large
on earnings.
This positive coefficient is not consistent with the substitution of public
for private pensions. We have made corresponding runs for women when average
monthly benefits are added, it has a negative, significant coefficient of 6.7.
14significant. These include being married, age, planning to stop work, assets,
and longest industry being manufacturers. While some of these results are
interesting in explaining sources of differences in age specific death rates,
our concern here is whether people expecting pensions are less likely to
die. The only three variables significant in both Tables 1 and 6 are married,
stop work, and manufacturing. The first and third of these have opposite
signs in the two tables which is consistent with the self selection Idea. The
stop work variable maybe measuring several forces. Those who expect to work
have less need for pensions because they will not retire. Those in poor
health may be forced to retire because of pain and suffering.
When prior health is added, the coefficients on better and worse health
are significant and have expected signs. Variables previously significant
remain so and do not change sign.
These results suggest that many people in poor health around age 60 have
been in poor health for long periods of time and that these people either opt
for positions with higher proportion of compensation in current wages or poor
health forced them to change jobs before the pension was vested.
Of course a comparison of the pattern of coefficients is not conclusive
evidence. It would seem that a better method would be to include the death
variable in the pension probit equation. Unfortunately since the pension
variable was asked In 1971, we must omit nearly half the people who died fron
the analyses.
This death dummy variable has a positive sign but Is not significant when
included in the analysis. It may be argued that' the death rate variable is
insignificant because too many other variables are included.
In Table 7 we present for those who died between 1971 and 1973 the
15proportion of people who expected to have a pension. In the sample, 34.8% of
the people have pensions. Thus for the period 1971—1973, a slightly higher
proportion of the people who died expected to have a pension.
To check further on the relationship between pensions and death we decid—
ed to use the white males 65 and older in the 1973 CPS—SSA Exact Match Tape.
A description of this sample can be found in Taubman and Rosen. But briefly
the March 1973 ci's was matched to Social Security Administration records which
record date of death for those who died subsequent to the date the match is
made. In our version of the tape we have fairly complete death information
through 1976 and partial data for1977.11 The pension data are taken from the
1973 source of Income questions.
Our probit estimate (with t statistics in parentheses) for 5038 men is
Prob of Pension =.41+ —.14 Age + .079 Died 7377
(2.0) (5.1) (1.7)
Once again those who died are more likely to have a pension and this time the
t value has risen to 1.7.
In many instances a person must stop working for a company to receive a
pension from it. Poor health may induce a person to stop working and collect
his pension. People eligible for but not drawing a pension may be in very
good health. When a nonparticipation in the labor force in 1973 variable is
included, the coefficient on died decreases to .029 and the t statistic falls
to .62. Of course the labor force variable may represent other factors- than
Taubman and Rosen indicate that the data on death for white males in this
age range are close to complete in this sample.
16those just described, but in any event there is no direct evidence that those
with pensions have longer life expectancies.
Changes in Mortality and the Present Discounted Value of Pension Benefits
The present discounted value of pension benefits obviously depend on
expected longevity. Recently the age specific death rates have changed sharp-
ly. In this section we will examine some of these trends and indicate some of
the redistributive effects of the changes.
The 1973-79 percentage changes in death rates in various age intervals
are shown in Table 8. For those 45 and over the reduction is about 15% for
all age, race and sex groups though it Is a little lower than this In the 75
to 84 and a little larger in the 85 and over group. To evaluate the impact of
this change we rely on a study by Winkelvoss which Is summarized in the tables
9 and 10.
The effects of unexpected changes in mortality on pension funds can be
measured by the change in the present discounted value of benefits paid:.
Winkelvoss provides such an estimate.
He uses a standard plan in which the pension benefits are based on the
final 5 year average earnings. For those not retired, earnings grow 7% a
year. The nominal interest rate is 7%. Nonactive workers benefits are.
assumed fixed in nominal terms. Benefits are reduced actuarially for early
retirement. There are also vested benefits, disability benefits, and
surviving spouse benefits. However retirement benefits account for 77.9% of
the present discounted value of the benefit package.
Winkelvoss has investigated the impacts of various mortality rate
changes. For example in Table 3, which along with the text is drawn from. his
Chapter 15, a mortality rate of .5 Indicates that all age specific mortality
17rates are reduced to 1/2 of their GAM level (but In all instances no one lives
beyond 110 years).
The first column applies if only pre 65 mortality rates are changed, the
second if only post 65 rates are changed and the third if both pre and post 65
rates are changed. As shown in the table) changes In pre 65 mortality do not
have important monetary effects but the post 65 changes are more important. A
25% reduction at all ages will increase the present value of all the costs by
about 1OZ.3
Suppose the death rates stay at their 1979 levels which are about 15%
below those in 1971. Interpolating from Winkelvoss the PDV of the benefits
rise by about 5%. Of course the change in the premiums required to make the
payments depend on whether the plan has been partially or fully funded.
Winklevoss and McGill, for example, report that in response to a 25% drop in
mortality, a 50% funded plan would have its costs rise an extra 3 1/2 percen-
tage points.
Let us suppose that for those 65 and over that death rates continu.e to
decline at the rate of 2 1/2% per year.12 Then by the end of 35 years in
which the member of the current 25 to 34 year old cohort reaches 65, the
average annual death rate would decrease by nearly 60%, for example, for the
'all" category from 2.9% a year to 1.7%. Winkelvoss' table suggests an
increase in costs of about 20%. The corresponding reductions for the current—
No adjustment is made to the mortality expectations for the spouse. The
surviving spouse who receives a pension will have a longer life and greater
payments if her life expectancy increases. However since this benefit only
accounts for 4% of the cost of the standard plan, the bias is small.
12 Thereare obviously better techniques to estimate a trend but the
intervening years clearly show the trend. For the types of results we pursue
here, the 2 1/2% per year figure yields correct orders of magnitude.
18ly 35—45,45—55 and 55 to 65 age groups are 47%, 32% and 12%. Approximate
costs estimates can be interpolated from tables 9 and 10.
Vital Statistics classifies people by age) race and sex. It is known,
however, that age specific death rates vary by eduation and other personal
characteristics, Rosen and Taubman (RT), for example, have calcualted age
specific death rates for various education and marital status groups using
data for the 1970's and have compared their results with those from 1960
obtained by Kitagawa and Hauser (KU). The relevant information is summarized
in Table 11. For white males 65 and over, KH find no effects of education
while RT find the more educated have substantially lower death rates.
Interestingly when RT restrict their analysis to those 78 and older in 1973,
who are the survivors of the KB 65 and older group of 1960, RT still find the
most educated have a death rate about 60% of that of the least educated.
Between 1960 and 1970, there was about a 10% drop in the overall death
rate in the 25—64 and 65+ age groups for white males. We have recalculated
the death rates in each year using the education distribution in the other
year. Using 1975 weights, the 1960 computed rate would differ by .001 from
the 1975 rate. Similarly using the 1960 weights, the recalculated value for
1975 differs by .002 from the 1960 actual figure. Thus if education is a
causative factor, much of the observed shift from 1960 to 1975 is attributable
to a shift in the educational attainment of the population.
Both KR and RT find that widowed and divorced men have substantially
higher death rates than comparable married men. Using the marital status
distribution in 1960 and 1975, we have recalculated death rates with the other
year weights. For those under 65, the weights are similar and the recal-
culated numbers are unchanged. For those over 65, there would have been
19almost no change in the death rates if the weights had not changed, i.e., if
the percent of married had not risen sharply.
If education is a cause of death differentials, the shift in the
educational distribution of the population will cause even further shifts in
the average age specific mortality level. For example if we take the Rosen—
Taubman death rates by education level for 1975 by individual age and impose a
trend decrease of 2 1/2% per year, the death rate in the 65—74 year age group
would decline about 70%. If, howver, the education distribution had not
changed the decline would have been 64%. Similar differences are found at
other age levels.
Conclusion
The probability of having a pension is related to education, marital
status, occupation, industry and assets. Most varIables have the expected
sign though managers Is negative for males. The probability equation is very
similar for males and females.
There is some indication that less healthy elderly people, who in general
are more likely to die sooner, are less likely to have pensions. However, in
both RHS and the CPS—SSA samples thOse with pensions are at least as likely to
die as those without.
There has been a sharp drop in the age specific death rate in recent
years. Longer life expectancy will increase the present value of pension
payments. The extra costs, however, will only be large either if the trend
continues into the far future or if the especially sharp decrease among the
educated and married, who are more likely to have pensions and to have larger
amounts continue.
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22Notes
Occupation
Prof. =— Professional,technical, and kindred workers
—farmersand farm managers
Blue Collar —Craftsmen,foremen and kindred workers
—Operativesand kindred workers
—Privatehousehold workers
—Serviceworkers except private household
—farmlaborers and foremen
—Laborersexcept farm and mine
Managers =— Managers,officials,proprietors









Professional and related servies
Util. =— Transportation,communication and public utilities
Farm —Agriculture,forestry and fisheries
Excluded =— Mining
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PROPORTION DEPENDENT VARIABLE ) 0
ESTIMATED MEANPROBABILITYTHAT DEP 'JAR
ESTIMATEC PROBABILITY AT SAMPLE MEANS =
LOGOF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION =
(—2.0)TIMES LOG LIKELIHOOD RATIC =
DEGREESOF FREEDOM FOR CHI—SQUARE =
PROBITCOEFFICIENTS HAVE BEEN WRIITEN ON UNIT 10
END OF PROBIT ESTIMATE NC. 4
O.34E




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Notes to Table 4
Proportion Dependent Variable >0= 0.2164
Estimated Mean Probability that Dep. Var. >0= 0.2161
Estimated Probability at Sample Means 0.1943
Log Of Likelihood Function = —1331.1199
(—2.0) Times Log Likelihood Ratio = 287.0077


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PROpORTIONOEPENDEr'JT VARIABLE ) 0 = 0.0973
ESTIMATED MEAN PRORAPILITY TH'T DEp VAR
ESTIMATED PROBABILIIY AT SAMPLE ME4S = 0.09I
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD FuNCTIoN = -2.339
N2.0) TIMES LOG LIKELIHOOD RATIO = l65.PE9l
DEGREESOF FREEDOMFOR CHI-SQUARE= 17
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS HAVEBEENwRITTEr oi U;41T10
END OF PROBIT ESTIMATE MO. 1Table 7
Percentage of People who Died 1971—1973
Who Expected to Receive a Pension











25—34 35—4445—54 55—64 65—74 75—84 85+
Total —9.4 —22.9—15.6 —14.9—15.1—11.6 —20.6
Male —4.6 —20.2—16.3 —15.9—15.1 —9.7 —18.8
Female —20.3—27.4 —14 7 —13.3—15.0—12.5 —21.0
White —6.4—21.3 —15.0—14.8—14.1—12.8 —19.3
White
Male —1.9 —19.9—15.9 —16.5—14.6—10.6 —17.0
Source: Vital Statistics.Table
Effect of Mortality
Pension Costs as a Percentage of the Cost under
StandardAssumptions for the E(PVFB)Function
Mortality Rate Ages Less than Ages 65 and
Multiple 65 Only over Only All Ages
0.50. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105.6 116.1 123.0
0.75. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102.8 107 .0 110 .G
1.00. .. . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . . .100.0 100.0 100.0
1.25.......... .. ... ... ..97.3 94.4 91.9
1.50. .. . . ........ . . . . . . .98.4 89.7 85.2
Source: Winkelvoss, Chapter 15 (Table 15—1).Table ]0
Pension Cost Components as a Percentage
of the Cost under Standard Assumptions
for the E(PVFB)Function
Mortality Rate Retirement Vested Disability Surviving
Multiple Benefits Benefits Benefits SpouseTotal
Benefits Cost
0.50............ 128.1 130.2 105.1 52.5 123.0
0.75............ 112.3 113.2 102.5 76.9 110.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
90.0 89.2 97.6 122.0 9l.9
81.6 80.2 95.2 142.8 85.2
Source: Winkelvoss, Chapter 15 (Table 15—2).Table 11
Relative, Age Adjusted, Death Rates by
Education, Earnings and Marital Status:
















13—15 .85 1.13 .98 ..77
16+ .70 .84 .77
Family In9m
in1969$.--':I
2,000 1.51 2.65 110 1.22


















Single 1.75 1.13 1.44 ..95









'Re1ative toaverage death rate.
'Re1ative toaverage death rate for married.
c/—Mostlydivorced.
"Infiated by the CPI and by the growth in real per capita income from 1959—1972.
Source: 1960 is 1(11, pp. 12, 109. 1973 is CPS—SSA.